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STEVE JOBS GOT FIRED FROM APPLE. Then he walked straight into MIT and dropped the most raw, unfilte

Vipul Kumar Kewat

Vipul Kumar Kewat

@VipulKewatTech

November 18, 2026· 69:50

STEVE JOBS GOT FIRED FROM APPLE. Then he walked straight into MIT and dropped the most raw, unfiltered 60-minute business masterclass ever recorded. Zero PR bullshit. Zero image to protect. Just pure, brutal honesty from the man who built Apple once and was about to rebuild it even bigger. Stop scrolling. Watch this tonight instead of Netflix. Bookmark it. Come back to it.

Transcript

Thank you
0:02
Hi
0:03
I
0:04
I guess we get to spend an hour
0:05
or so together today
0:07
and most of the time I wanted to
0:08
spend just
0:09
talking about what you want to talk and answering some questions
0:12
but I, I thought if you wanted
0:13
I'd take about ten minutes or fifteen minutes
0:15
up front
0:16
and tell you
0:17
what we're doing next and why the world
0:19
might need another computer company
0:21
Is that something
0:22
do you guys think about these things?
0:25
Okay
0:29
I thought I'd tell you about some of our mistakes
0:30
maybe that would be more useful
0:31
but we have a lot of scar tissue
0:34
We
0:37
there's a really interesting book
0:39
that was written by a guy named
0:41
Paul Strassman
0:43
and Paul has one of the more interesting
0:45
jobs in the planet. He's this chief information officer
0:48
CIO of a very large organization called the Pentagon
0:52
and
0:54
They really understand software there
0:56
I had a conversation with him not too long ago
0:58
and he said
0:58
the lesson from the Gulf War was that
1:00
the best software will win the war
1:03
And so they're trying to do a lot
1:04
of work in the software area
1:07
He wrote a book
1:08
though, before he got this job
1:10
called The Business Value of Computers
1:11
It's rather thick, and it's not good bedtime reading
1:14
but you can plow through it
1:15
and there's some incredible stuff in it
1:17
And he asked two questions in particular
1:22
One was he surveyed a bunch of companies
1:25
from not very successful all the way up
1:27
to really successful
1:29
And there's somebody taking notes here
1:32
And he asked
1:34
He asked how much they spent on information
1:37
technology as a percentage of revenues
1:39
And he got a very counterintuitive answer
1:41
right? You'd think that either the really successful
1:43
companies would either spend
1:44
more or less than the not successful companies
1:47
depending on your theory
1:48
But it was exactly the same
1:49
They all spent
1:50
about two percent of revenues on information technology
1:53
And he found this curious
1:55
and so he asked another question
1:57
How do they spend their money?
1:59
And he found out that the
2:01
the really successful ones
2:02
or actually, let's start with the not so successful ones
2:06
as we, success increases, and dollars increase
2:10
he found out that the not so successful
2:12
ones spent the majority of their money on management productivity
2:18
and
2:19
the more successful ones spent the majority of
2:21
their money on operational productivity applications
2:26
right?
2:27
Now, this was not very pleasant for me to read
2:30
because I spent the first ten years of
2:31
my life on management productivity
2:34
which was PCs
2:35
right? PCs and Macs never attacked operational productivity
2:40
They just attacked management productivity
2:42
Why is that? Because
2:43
you can't go down to your local computer
2:46
store and buy an app
2:47
that will help you do stock trading
2:50
or will help you
2:51
run a hospital, or will help you
2:55
in whatever operational part of your business you wanna automate
2:59
right? Unless you're a very
2:59
very small business
3:00
then you could run some accounting packages
3:02
But other than that
3:02
if you were a medium-sized or a large business
3:04
these things never attacked operational productivity
3:08
So we zoom out and we say
3:13
how have people attacked operational productivity with information technology?
3:16
Well, in the sixties
3:18
they bought a mainframe and they got some
3:19
terminals and a bunch of COBOL programmers and
3:21
they wrote a few apps
3:23
And most of them were kinda backroom apps
3:26
And it sort of worked for the
3:28
very few that could afford to do this
3:29
In the seventies, they got a mainframe and some terminals
3:33
and they did the same thing
3:34
and a few of them got a few
3:35
mini computers and terminals and tried to do
3:37
it a little cheaper. In the eighties
3:39
nothing changed. Mainframe and terminals
3:41
minis and terminals
3:42
until maybe about two or three years ago
3:46
What happened two or three years ago
3:48
was that the front office started to
3:51
realize that they needed operational apps
3:55
so bad that they couldn't depend on
3:58
on the MIS folks anymore
4:00
They started taking life into their own hands
4:03
And working with, sometimes working with the MIS folks
4:05
to start downsizing and getting some servers
4:09
and running some
4:10
industry standard databases like Sybase or Oracle in
4:12
the servers
4:13
and making a little local area network and
4:15
getting maybe some Sun workstations
4:17
and spending about two years writing some mission critical operational applications
4:23
like trading apps for Wall Street
4:25
perfect example
4:26
And it kinda worked
4:28
And the reason that they needed to do
4:30
this
4:31
was because more and more they were discovering
4:33
that things like new products required a
4:37
a custom operational application
4:40
An example
4:41
if you're in financial services
4:43
and you come up with a new product
4:44
it's only three things
4:46
It's an idea, it's a sales force
4:49
and it's a custom app
4:51
to bang on databases to make the product real
4:55
to do the mortgage swaps or whatever it
4:57
is you wanna do. Without the app
4:59
you don't have a product
5:01
And so
5:02
there's been a
5:03
increasing buildup of demand from
5:06
the front parts of corporations
5:09
to create more and more and more of
5:11
these operational applications
5:14
And
5:14
I think it's gonna get to the point
5:16
where
5:18
this becomes
5:19
fairly clear that this is the next
5:22
big revolution in desktop computing
5:25
is to create these op
5:26
to attack the operational productivity
5:29
and as we start to re-engineer the way we do things
5:32
to
5:32
automate a lot of this in custom applications
5:36
Sounds a little strange now to most people
5:37
Sounds like desktop publishing did in 1985
5:40
Nobody knew what it was
5:41
Everybody thought it was
5:42
kind of a strange vertical thing over there
5:44
But my guess is it's pretty horizontal
5:47
And we're attacking vertical markets now
5:51
that know they want this
5:54
and it's going extremely well
5:55
Sun is the only company that's really
5:57
had any success at this
5:59
and
6:00
we're knocking them out of the box
6:02
because we came up with this software called NextStep
6:05
which lets you build apps five to ten
6:07
times faster than anything anyone's ever seen
6:10
And after you build them
6:11
they're deployable and usable by mere mortals
6:13
cause it's really easy to use this computer
6:16
And
6:16
you can interoperate your custom apps seamlessly with
6:19
a bunch of off-the-shelf productivity apps
6:21
So we go to these companies that
6:23
use Suns and take two years to write
6:25
their apps or are thinking about using Suns
6:27
and they can write their apps in about
6:29
ninety days on a Next
6:30
Now, if you're on Wall Street and you can write
6:33
you can create a new product in ninety
6:35
days versus your competitor in two years
6:37
that's
6:38
eight new products you can field for their
6:40
every one
6:41
And you can start to see the competitive
6:43
advantage that can be created this way
6:46
Now
6:46
we had no idea
6:48
that we were any good at this when
6:49
we started Next
6:52
A lot of times you don't know what
6:54
your competitive advantage is when you
6:57
launch a new product
7:00
let me give you a historical example
7:01
When we created the
7:02
how many of you guys use Macs?
7:04
Good
7:07
How many of you have seen a Next?
7:09
Oh, that's, how many of you use a Next?
7:12
Oh, that's not so bad
7:16
we'd like to change that ratio
7:17
We're on the right track anyway
7:20
We, when we started, when we did the Macintosh
7:25
we never anticipated desktop publishing when we created
7:28
the Mac
7:30
Sounds funny
7:31
because that turned out to be the Mac's compelling advantage
7:33
right? The thing that it did
7:35
not
7:36
one and a half or two times better than everything else
7:37
but, you know
7:38
four or five times better than anything else
7:40
where you had to have one
7:42
We never anticipated it. We anticipated bitmap displays and laser printers
7:46
but we never thought about PageMaker or that
7:47
whole industry really coming down to the desktop
7:50
Maybe we weren't smart enough
7:52
But we were smart enough to see it
7:54
start to happen nine to twelve months later
7:58
And we
7:59
changed our entire marketing and business strategy
8:02
to focus on desktop publishing
8:04
and it became the Trojan horse that eventually
8:06
got the Mac into corporate America
8:08
where it could show its owners all the
8:09
other wonderful things it could do
8:12
Likewise, when we created NextStep
8:16
this revolutionary object-oriented software that we have
8:20
our target customer coming from the PC world
8:23
where shrink-wrapped apps were king
8:25
was Lotus and Adobe and WordPerfect and all
8:28
the shrink-wrapped apps developers
8:29
And
8:30
the purpose was to let them create their
8:32
apps five to ten times faster
8:33
these shrink-wrapped apps. And it worked
8:34
We have a ton of shrink-wrapped apps now
8:36
best of breed in almost every category
8:39
But it wasn't till early in ninety one
8:43
early last year, a little over a year ago
8:45
that some really big companies came to us and said
8:47
you don't understand what you've got
8:50
The same software that
8:52
allows Lotus to create their apps five to
8:54
ten times faster
8:56
is letting us
8:57
build our in-house mission critical apps five to
8:59
ten times faster
9:01
And this is the biggest problem we've had
9:04
This is a huge problem for every big
9:06
company and almost all medium sized companies
9:09
and you have a solution in your hands
9:10
and you dummies don't even know it
9:13
And it took them about three months before
9:14
we finally heard it
9:17
and last summer we
9:18
changed our whole sales and marketing strategy around
9:21
to focus on that
9:22
and it's taken off like a rocket
9:24
And
9:24
we grew about four X last year and
9:26
probably grow about two X this year
9:29
And our customer list is
9:31
is now very, very strong and, and growing
9:34
Like crazy. We just got back from spending
9:36
a few days in D.C
9:37
and in New York
9:38
and
9:40
we're talking to customers we only dreamed of
9:42
talking to a year ago
9:44
So that's what we do
9:46
And, our arch enemy's son
9:50
they want to kill us
9:52
which is good. They
9:53
they should try to do that as soon as possible
9:55
because the sooner they do it
9:56
the cheaper it will be for them
9:58
But they won't s- I
10:02
think it's gone past the point where it's
10:04
possible
10:05
And they can't, the, the greatest thing is hardware is really
10:08
hardware churns every eighteen months
10:10
It's
10:10
pretty impossible
10:12
to get a sustainable competitive advantage from hardware
10:17
if you're lucky
10:17
you can make something one and a half
10:19
or two times as good as your competitor
10:21
which probably isn't enough to be quite a competitive advantage
10:24
and it only lasts for six months
10:27
But software seems to take a lot longer
10:30
for people to catch up with
10:32
I watched Microsoft take eight or nine years
10:34
to catch up with the Mac
10:36
and it's arguable whether they've even caught up
10:39
it takes a long time
10:41
and we think
10:42
that the soonest we're gonna have a true
10:43
competitor is probably four to five years
10:46
So we've got that amount of time
10:49
to grow ourselves a one to two billion
10:51
dollar company
10:52
so that we can compete with them on scale
10:54
See
10:54
today we can't compete with them on scale
10:57
We never have as many salespeople as they do
10:59
as Sun does
10:59
we don't have the ad budgets that they do
11:01
so we've gotta have a better product
11:04
Assuming, and I hope we always have a better product
11:06
and I think we can
11:07
but
11:08
I'd also like to be able to at
11:09
least give them a run for their money
11:10
on scale
11:11
So we've got the next three to four
11:13
years to run
11:14
really fast so that by the time they
11:16
even get close to having a competitive product
11:18
we're at a large enough scale
11:20
to where we can start to compete with
11:21
them
11:22
And that's what we're doing with our lives
11:24
right now
11:25
Spending a lot of time with customers
11:27
spending a lot of time making Next Step better
11:30
And, that kind of thing
11:33
So
11:34
that's the strategic basis of what we do
11:36
Does that make any sense to you?
11:41
have you run across the concept of sort
11:43
of operational custom applications at all?
11:47
I mean, you guys
11:47
most of you come from companies where you've had work experience
11:50
right?
11:51
And you've all done that?
11:52
So do you
11:52
do you have this problem in the companies
11:54
you come from
11:55
of a lot of pressure to write these
11:57
operational custom applications and
11:59
hardly anything coming out of the spigot
12:01
to satisfy this thirst?
12:04
Yeah
12:05
How many of you from Wall Street?
12:08
Good
12:10
Good
12:11
How many of you are from manufacturing companies?
12:14
Oh, excellent
12:16
Where, where are the rest of you from?
12:21
Cons, oh, how many from consulting?
12:24
Oh, that's bad
12:28
Yeah. A mind is too important to waste
12:35
You should do something
12:51
The only consultants I've seen that I think
12:53
are truly useful are the ones that help
12:54
us sell our computers
12:56
But other than that
12:57
no, seriously, I, I
12:59
I don't think there's anything inherently evil in
13:01
consulting. I think that
13:06
I think that without
13:08
without owning something, over an extended period of time
13:13
like a few years
13:15
Where one has a chance to take responsibility for one's recommendations
13:20
where one has to
13:21
see one's recommendations through all action stages
13:24
and accumulate scar tissue for the mistakes and
13:26
pick oneself up off the ground and dust oneself off
13:31
one learns a fraction
13:35
of what one can. What you're
13:36
you're coming in and making recommendations and not owning the results
13:41
not owning the implementation
13:44
I think is, is, a fraction of the
13:49
of the value
13:50
and a fraction of the
13:51
opportunity to learn and get better
13:54
And so what, what you
13:56
you do get a broad cut at companies
13:59
but it's very thin
14:00
It's like a picture of a
14:02
I would, I could use
14:04
I'm a vegetarian, so I won't use steak
14:05
but it's like a picture of a
14:07
of a banana
14:09
it, you might get a very accurate picture
14:12
but it's only two dimensional
14:15
And without the experience of actually doing it
14:19
you never get three-dimensional. So you might have
14:21
a lot of pictures on your walls
14:22
You can show it off to your friends
14:24
You can say, oh, look, I've worked in bananas
14:25
I've worked in peaches
14:26
I've worked in grapes
14:28
but you never really taste it
14:31
And, and I think that
14:32
that, that's, that's what I think
14:44
But you're also a variable expense
14:45
and in hard times
14:46
you find yourself
14:50
you find yourself variable
14:51
right?
14:52
Yes
15:00
Right. Very good question
15:02
I'm gonna generalize your question
15:04
Why don't we just become a software company
15:06
right? It's a very good question
15:10
It's a subtle question. I'm gonna try to go through some
15:12
several things and, Sorry if I jump around
15:17
We got a lot of requests from customers
15:20
last year
15:21
that they would love to see Next Step
15:23
on other platforms and primarily
15:26
Intel-based platforms like the 486
15:29
So we decided to do just that
15:32
and we have ported Next Step to the 486
15:34
and we're finishing it now
15:35
and it'll ship in
15:37
September-October timeframe
15:39
And it's exactly the same stuff we run
15:41
on our own computer
15:42
And same apps, same user interface, same training, same development environment
15:48
and we're gonna sell it for nine ninety-five
15:50
and we're OEMing it to a bunch of
15:52
companies whose names you'll recognize quite easily
15:54
and OEMing it to them at a much cheaper price
15:58
And
16:00
everybody's coming out of the woodwork to help
16:01
us
16:02
We're getting help from Novell
16:04
we're getting help from all the developers
16:06
Intel's really helping us
16:08
and they really want us to succeed
16:10
Why is that?
16:12
Right
16:13
They all want to make sure
16:15
that there's a choice out there
16:17
and they're all really scared about Microsoft
16:19
And they see Next Step as the only
16:21
thing on the horizon that can challenge Microsoft and system software
16:25
for the next several years
16:26
So we're enjoying, a lot of help
16:28
and, you know, boy, we need it, so that's good
16:31
Now
16:32
we've also had a lot of requests from
16:34
companies to port Next Step to other platforms
16:36
and we're talking to some of those companies right now
16:39
Now, Sun
16:40
we got a lot of requests from Sun
16:41
customers to port Next Step to Sun
16:43
So a lot of them are saying
16:44
look, we, we may not want to buy them anymore
16:45
but we already bought 500
16:46
and we don't want to throw them in
16:47
the bay
16:47
So can we put your software on them?
16:49
Because Sun's falling behind in software
16:51
Now
16:52
Sun says they'd rather stick needles in their
16:54
eyes than help us do this
16:57
That's a quote
16:59
And
17:03
so we're evaluating right now which will be worse for Sun
17:09
if we port it or if we don't
17:10
port it
17:11
And since we're fairly
17:14
since we're fairly customer driven
17:15
we'll probably end up doing what the customers
17:17
ask us to do
17:18
cause we want to make them happy
17:20
Now, this leads one into the question
17:23
well, this leads one into the question
17:25
should we just be a software company?
17:27
And we think the answer is no
17:29
We think we should be
17:30
a software company and a hardware company
17:33
In making the decision
17:35
to put NextStep on more than our own platforms
17:39
we clearly decided that we will sell less
17:41
than a hundred percent of the NextStep hardware
17:44
However
17:45
we think that the marketplace will grow
17:47
and we will sell more absolute hardware
17:51
And secondly
17:52
the charter of our hardware division is to
17:53
make the best NextStep hardware
17:55
Might not be the cheapest
17:57
might not be this
17:57
might not be that
17:58
but we think all in all we can
17:59
make the best stuff
18:01
And I would love it
18:02
nothing better
18:03
than if someday we only sold twenty or
18:05
twenty-five percent of the NextStep hardware
18:07
but I still think that's a w-
18:09
billion dollar plus hardware business
18:12
and I'll get into one other hardware
18:14
related reason in a minute
18:21
I have, there's some things I can't talk about here
18:23
It's
18:28
in addition to that
18:30
if you look at how we sell our computers right now
18:37
we have a sales force in the US
18:38
of about 130 professionals in the field
18:41
out selling next computers
18:43
They spend 90% of their time
18:47
selling next step software
18:50
and then 10% of their time selling the
18:53
hardware
18:55
In other words
18:55
if they can get the customer to buy into next step
18:58
then they're gonna sell the hardware
19:00
cause right now we have the only hardware
19:01
it runs on
19:02
So
19:03
they are out there
19:04
selling next step right now
19:07
And this is what is required
19:09
to launch a new innovative product
19:12
The
19:12
current distribution channels for the computer industry
19:16
over the last several years
19:17
have lost their ability to create demand
19:21
They can fulfill demand
19:23
but they can't create it
19:24
If a new product comes out
19:26
you're lucky if you can find somebody at
19:27
the computer store that even knows how to demo it
19:30
right?
19:31
So the more innovative the product is
19:34
the more revolutionary it is
19:35
and not just an incremental improvement
19:38
the more you're stuck
19:40
because the existing channels only fulfilling demand
19:42
Matter of fact
19:42
it's getting so bad that it's getting wiped out
19:46
because there are more efficient channels to fulfill demand
19:49
like the telephone and Federal Express
19:52
So we're seeing
19:53
that the channel become condensed on its way to
19:56
I think, just telebusiness
19:58
So how does one
19:59
bring innovation to the marketplace?
20:02
We believe
20:02
the only way
20:03
we know how to do it right now
20:04
is with the direct sales force out there
20:06
in front of customers
20:08
showing them the products
20:09
in the environment of their own problems and
20:11
discussing how those problems can be mated with
20:13
these solutions
20:15
A software-only company
20:17
could never afford to field a direct sales
20:20
force
20:21
With average selling prices of five hundred dollars a software package
20:25
you could never afford a hundred and thirty
20:27
professionals in the field
20:30
With an average selling price of five thousand dollars
20:33
you can
20:35
And that's why
20:36
I don't think we're gonna see
20:38
any more system software companies succeed
20:42
I don't think it's possible to
20:44
fund the effort
20:46
to educate the market
20:48
about a revolutionary product with ASPs that low
20:52
And if it's not a revolutionary product
20:54
I don't think the company can succeed
20:57
So
20:57
our strategy has been that we've got to
21:00
be a hardware company
21:01
in order to make our software business succeed
21:05
And we think we can do really well
21:06
at both of them. I know that's a long answer
21:08
but, it's a complex problem too
21:14
Yes
21:34
Sure
21:36
if you ask us who our competitors are
21:38
we'll say really three things
21:40
Three, one is Sun Solaris software
21:43
the other is Microsoft
21:45
and the third is Taligent
21:47
Take them in that order
21:48
Sun
21:50
For a while had a
21:52
software value added because they had the best
21:54
Unix in the marketplace
21:55
but the market's moved way beyond that
21:57
and unfortunately Sun hasn't
21:58
So their software's falling further and further behind
22:01
and we, while we take them very seriously
22:03
we don't think Solaris is going to be
22:05
much competition. It's not
22:06
doesn't have an object in it
22:09
and, and
22:10
it's pretty much what they have today
22:12
Microsoft is doing NT
22:15
which is their sort of second attempt at a Unix wannabe
22:18
and that's great
22:19
and I think it'll be better than the last one
22:20
which was OS2
22:22
but fundamentally it's just an operating system
22:24
It's better plumbing for Windows
22:26
It's a good way of thinking of it
22:28
Unfortunately, you still stuck with Windows in all of its glory
22:32
including
22:33
The worst development environment that's ever been invented
22:37
And so
22:38
we don't think that this is really going
22:39
to present a challenge to what we're going after
22:42
which are these mission critical custom apps
22:44
because the development environment is horrendous
22:46
it's not object oriented
22:47
and even with the better plumbing
22:49
we
22:49
we think it will be
22:50
widely rejected for what we do
22:55
in terms of Taligent
22:56
Taligent represents the first true competitor that we
23:00
could have
23:01
They're going to ship a product around 1995
23:05
if, if they execute to their plans
23:07
And I think if they
23:09
if they do execute to their plans and work really hard
23:11
by about the mid nineties
23:12
they'll have roughly what we have today
23:15
And that, that's not meant as a joke
23:17
it still means we have to run very hard
23:18
because they're, they
23:19
they will have a lot of resources at
23:21
their disposal
23:22
I think there's a lot of questions as
23:24
to whether they will ever ship a product
23:25
I think they're
23:26
a few years away from
23:28
having something running on But we take them very seriously
23:32
Now
23:32
they've helped us enormously
23:34
because they've blessed object-oriented programming
23:37
And right now
23:38
we're the only folks that have it and
23:39
will be for the next three
23:40
four years
23:42
So if we can't compete with Taligent
23:45
it's probably because we've shot ourselves in the
23:47
foot
23:48
You couldn't ask for something better
23:50
IBM and Apple saying
23:51
these guys are right on track
23:54
and
23:54
come back in five years and we'll have
23:55
it too
23:57
It's great
23:59
And, and so the ball's in our court
24:04
Yeah
24:05
Yes, in back
24:22
The market, or the specialized niche that you're describing
24:26
and then the general market for those of
24:27
us who don't develop apps
24:28
Are you saying that even in British ground
24:31
an environmental logic develop apps into an operating system
24:34
it'll be like Windows or MS-DOS on the logic?
24:38
Well, let's get our terminology straight
24:40
We look at NextStep as an operating environment
24:43
much more than an operating system
24:46
The Unix, which is our operating system
24:48
is ten percent of NextStep
24:50
So
24:53
in these modern operating environments
24:55
when you develop a custom app in NextStep
24:58
it doesn't run on the Mac
24:59
or on Windows
25:01
Can't. You need
25:02
all the objects that come with NextStep to
25:04
make it work
25:05
And
25:06
and let me go into a little detail
25:07
there. How many of you are technical here?
25:10
A lot. Okay, great
25:11
Well, we've discovered something
25:14
You don't write code any faster in NextStep
25:17
than you do in
25:18
any other operating and development environment that we know of
25:22
However, to do a particular app on average
25:25
you write about twenty
25:27
percent of the code
25:29
that you do
25:30
in any other development environment we know of
25:33
About twenty percent of the code
25:35
than in Sun or in anything else
25:38
So the code that's the fastest to write
25:41
the code that's the easiest to maintain
25:44
and the code that never breaks is the
25:45
code you don't write
25:47
So that's our strategy
25:48
write a lot less code
25:51
And one of the ways
25:52
the way we do this is we
25:54
enable the developer to
25:56
use a lot of objects
25:58
that others have written. We ship
25:59
six years worth of objects with Next Step
26:02
You can
26:03
create your own objects for your own company
26:05
and then reuse them around your developers
26:07
and there's now independent third-party companies not selling system software
26:11
not selling applications, but selling objects
26:14
There's about a, not quite ten of them
26:16
and it's starting
26:18
and I think it's gonna be a very
26:19
big thing
26:20
So in order to
26:22
deliver these apps that are created on Next Step
26:24
you have to have Next Step so they
26:26
can run on top and take advantage of
26:27
this rich community of objects
26:30
And that's why we're porting Next Step to
26:32
the 486. That's why you'll see Next Step
26:34
running on several hardware platforms
26:37
And
26:40
will there be a fracturing
26:42
if you will?
26:43
Sure
26:43
To some extent there will
26:44
and I, I, I tend to look at it as a
26:46
a transition
26:48
Was there a fracturing when Mac came out?
26:50
Yes
26:51
And
26:52
there's been more of a transition as
26:54
people either move to Mac or
26:57
in the case of Windows
26:58
adopt what's good about the Mac
27:01
Same thing's gonna happen here
27:03
We believe very strongly that the benefits from these object-oriented environments
27:07
not only just rapid development
27:08
but a much richer user environment
27:10
If you use a Next
27:11
it's a lot nicer than a Mac or a PC
27:13
even if you never developed an app
27:16
Other environments will absorb some of those breakthroughs
27:20
and more and more people will use Next Step
27:23
and things will tend to
27:25
balance themselves out over time
27:26
But there will be a transition
27:28
and our goal is to make sure we're
27:30
part of it
27:31
Yeah
27:33
Yeah
27:54
Good question
27:55
If our business strategy
27:57
says that we do a lot of things well
28:00
but the tip of our arrow
28:01
or our Trojan horse
28:02
which is getting us into these large and medium-sized accounts
28:06
is our custom application development ability
28:09
then our growth is going to be paced
28:11
among other things
28:13
by
28:14
The development community available to these companies to develop these apps
28:18
right?
28:19
Now
28:20
even though we have
28:21
shrunk the development time down to a fraction
28:23
of what it was
28:24
still, without developers out there
28:27
we're not gonna win
28:29
Fortunately, most companies, have really
28:35
increased the staffs
28:37
of good people in their IS departments
28:39
dramatically in the last several years
28:40
last four or five years
28:42
There's now really bright people
28:44
who know
28:44
something about computer science in IS departments
28:47
And most of the industries we talk to
28:49
whether they're healthcare, financial services, even law enforcement, places like that
28:53
have on-site developers in their IS teams
28:56
If not
28:57
there's starting to become a lot of VARs
28:59
and people out there that we're using
29:01
in LA or in New York
29:02
where I just was
29:03
we probably have about ten independent third-party companies
29:05
helping parts of Wall Street develop things
29:08
So
29:08
I think that's not gonna be a stumbling
29:10
block
29:12
My personal opinion is the number of people
29:14
in applications development is shrinking
29:16
It exploded in the eighties with PCs
29:19
but now that industry is consolidating
29:21
It's consolidating down to very few companies
29:24
and
29:25
there's a lot of excess people out there
29:26
that I think
29:28
are starting to get channeled into some of these
29:30
other areas
29:32
So, so far it hasn't been a problem
29:34
but if, you know, if you want to do that
29:35
please call us and tell us
29:36
cause we always need more
29:38
So
29:39
what are you guys all gonna do when
29:40
you get out of here?
29:40
You gonna go back to your companies?
29:41
Is that
29:43
how many are you gonna go back?
29:45
How many aren't gonna go back?
29:46
What are you gonna do?
29:55
Well, yeah
29:56
I think we always have jobs for really smart technical people
29:59
you know, technically based people
30:00
and you guys are getting a great business education here
30:03
Yeah, we'd love to talk to you about it
30:07
Yeah, yes, sir
30:11
Go ahead
30:18
Well, these are deep questions
30:25
I tell you, I, I've obviously thought about this a lot
30:28
and I, I don't want to get into it too much
30:30
but I will say that
30:32
that, I think everybody lost
30:36
I think I lost
30:37
and I have wanted to spend my life
30:38
there
30:39
I think Apple lost
30:41
I think customers lost
30:44
And having said all that
30:47
so what? You go on
30:48
You know, it's not
30:50
as bad as a lot of things
30:51
Not as bad as
30:51
you know, losing your arm
30:54
Right? So people go on
30:57
and companies go on
30:59
and I think Apple
30:59
I'm
31:00
I'm very happy every time Apple ships a
31:01
Mac
31:02
Makes me very, very happy
31:04
I think the power books are decent products
31:06
I, I like em
31:09
But Apple has been struggling the last few
31:11
years. They've been having a real struggle with
31:13
who they want to be
31:14
and, and this is nothing new
31:15
We've always had that
31:17
That was part of what kept Apple alive
31:19
I think
31:20
And there were two camps within Apple
31:22
Camp one wanted to be the next serious computer company
31:26
and camp two
31:28
wanted to sort of be the Sony of
31:29
computers
31:31
And that struggling, I think
31:33
was somewhat tearing Apple apart
31:35
And fortunately, the Sony guys have won
31:38
They've kind of decided to go be the
31:40
the Sony of computers. And so the power
31:42
books are pretty good
31:42
but the Quadras, you know, suck wind right now
31:45
the high-end stuff
31:46
And they're abdicating, they're basically
31:50
not putting a lot of resources onto the
31:52
power users on desktops
31:54
And they've
31:55
they've
31:55
put most of their best people now on
31:57
the portables and on consumer products that they're
32:00
going to be coming out with
32:01
And I think they'll do very well at that
32:03
Now
32:03
there's a problem in there in that
32:08
If you look at the consumer products
32:10
that sell over a million a year
32:12
you can count them on a few hands
32:14
right?
32:15
It turns out there's not
32:16
I mean, consumer electronics products, not like toothbrushes, but, but electronics products
32:20
And so
32:22
let's assume they have one of those
32:24
right, or two of those
32:24
Let's say they have a product that sells
32:25
two million a year at
32:27
at a five hundred dollar ASP to them
32:28
so it sells to the consumer at
32:30
you know, seven ninety five or something like that
32:31
That, that's a hundred, that's what, a billion dollars, right?
32:36
Two million a year
32:38
five hundred bucks a piece
32:39
it's a billion dollars
32:40
They still have to get the other seven
32:42
billion of revenue somewhere
32:44
So
32:46
it's gonna be an interesting transition
32:48
as the ASPs get lower
32:51
The volumes have to get much
32:52
much higher
32:53
and you run into some
32:55
scale issues when you look out at the
32:56
consumer electronics industry. Not that it's not possible
32:59
and I think it's gonna be really interesting
33:00
to watch
33:02
And we also see a lot of
33:05
that's not quite that clarity of movement
33:08
but some movement in the Windows and
33:11
and, and PC world, again
33:13
towards taking what they have now and making it portable
33:17
but not giving
33:19
the top third of the market more power
33:22
You know
33:22
System 7 on the Mac was supposed to
33:24
be the second coming
33:25
and it wasn't. It turned out to be
33:26
you know, an incremental improvement
33:28
OS 2 was supposed to take us into new dimensions
33:31
and it turned out to be a complete failure
33:32
and they're gonna throw another hundred million dollars
33:35
after it just to make sure you all
33:36
know about it
33:38
and
33:39
and so
33:41
there's a
33:41
third of those desktops out there
33:44
that
33:45
the users and the people that wanna deploy
33:48
more sophisticated apps are
33:49
are
33:50
they're in the desert wanting something to drink
33:53
And I think there's a tremendous opportunity to
33:55
give them some solutions
33:57
And that doesn't mean that Apple's not gonna be successful
33:59
it just means they're gonna go off in
34:00
another direction
34:01
Do what
34:04
who knows what would have happened
34:05
you know, had, had all this not happened
34:07
So, yes. you've talked about the next product
34:13
So what does it cost us management
34:16
and then can you see it changing at all as you
34:19
as you hope go from a hundred and
34:20
twenty million dollar company to a
34:22
point billion dollar company? Sure
34:27
yeah, we're
34:28
we've done a lot in the last year
34:31
the most significant things we did
34:33
were one, we hired this guy right here
34:36
Mike Slade, is our VP of marketing
34:39
He spent, stand up
34:51
And he's cheap too
34:53
And, And Mike, Mike spent, seven or eight years at Microsoft
34:58
and, I originally met him
35:00
he was the product manager for Excel when
35:02
it first came out
35:02
and ended up running big pieces of marketing
35:04
for Microsoft. So Mike runs all the marketing at Next
35:06
and
35:07
Mike came in
35:08
to Next just about the time
35:09
when we were finally hearing what these big
35:11
companies were saying about mission-critical custom apps
35:14
and so
35:14
we've worked very closely together
35:16
to redefine the marketing strategy of the company
35:18
and Mike has done just a superb job
35:20
at that
35:21
The second, big thing we did was
35:25
about three months ago
35:27
a little over three months ago
35:28
we consolidated our hardware
35:32
design engineering, our manufacturing, our worldwide distribution
35:35
and hardware service all into one chunk
35:38
called the hardware division
35:39
So from cradle to grave
35:41
they have hardware responsibility
35:42
and we're in the process of forming the
35:44
software division right now
35:46
So that
35:48
We're all still under the same roof
35:50
but we have clarity about the fact that
35:52
we've got to make two businesses successful
35:57
the third thing that we did was
35:59
and, and we have a really great person running that
36:01
Rich Page
36:02
who's one of the founders of Next
36:03
He's doing a great job running that
36:07
we hired a new CFO recently
36:10
Marcel Ghani
36:11
He's from Intel, spent, spent twelve years at Intel doing
36:15
some pretty interesting jobs. He ran all of
36:16
finance for Europe
36:18
He ran all of internal audit for the
36:19
board. He ran all of manufacturing
36:21
planning and scheduling for a while and things
36:23
like that. He's a pretty good guy
36:25
Went to Cyprus for
36:26
a year and a half and then came to Next
36:28
and he's, he's great
36:30
and then recently, matter of fact, about last week
36:34
I hired a, chief operating officer
36:37
a guy named Peter Van Cuylenburg
36:39
and Peter is
36:41
Someone I first met when we were looking
36:43
for an executive vice president of sales and marketing
36:45
and he turned me down for the job
36:47
and we subsequently decided not to hire that
36:49
position
36:50
And I've been chasing him
36:51
for the last year and a half almost
36:53
He's really good. He
36:55
he spent a lot of time at TI
36:58
has run Europe
37:00
and
37:01
about three years ago went to a company
37:02
called Mercury Communications in England
37:05
They're the MCI of the UK
37:08
and turned that company around to about two billion dollars
37:10
and then was promoted to run half of cable and wire
37:14
or half of Mercury's parent company
37:16
Cable and Wireless, and was running
37:17
they're about six billion dollars
37:20
And, he went there when he thought that
37:23
communications and computing were gonna kinda come together
37:25
but never happened
37:27
And he
37:28
figured out that his real love is in
37:29
the computer business. He's very
37:31
very good operationally
37:33
So, that's just happened last week
37:35
It seems like all the good people I really wanna hire
37:37
it seems to take me a year to
37:38
hire em
37:39
And it's always been that way
37:40
even at Apple. Some of the best technical people or whoever
37:43
it always seemed to take me like a
37:44
year to pry them out of HP
37:47
or wherever
37:48
And it took me
37:50
it took me over a year to hire
37:51
I think Mike has the award
37:52
you're about a year and a half
37:55
and they're all worth it
37:57
what happens is I usually meet somebody that is really good
38:01
I think is very
38:01
very good, and you can't get them
38:03
and then you go try to find other people
38:05
and you, nobody measures up, you know
38:07
when you meet somebody that good
38:08
just, you always compare them to this one person
38:10
and you
38:10
you know you're gonna be settling for second
38:12
best if you compromise. And
38:14
I've always found it best
38:15
not to compromise and just keep chipping away
38:21
So, so I think we're
38:23
we're doing quite a bit
38:25
Feels like we're running the company a lot
38:26
better now than we ever have
38:28
We've definitely made our share of mistakes
38:32
Yeah
38:40
I'll
38:44
give you a global answer
38:44
then we can send in some details
38:50
I believe that you can
38:53
use the concept of technolo-technology windows opening
38:57
you know, and then eventually closing
38:59
But, and what I mean by that is enough technology
39:05
usually from fairly diverse places
39:08
comes together and makes
39:10
something that's a quantum leap forward possible
39:14
And it doesn't come out of nowhere
39:15
If you poke around the labs and you hang around
39:17
you know, the media lab here at MIT and other places
39:20
you can kind of get a feel for
39:21
some of those things
39:24
And usually they're not quite possible
39:25
but
39:26
all of a sudden you start to sense
39:27
things coming together and the planets lining up
39:30
to where this is now possible
39:32
or barely possible
39:34
And a window opens up
39:36
And it usually takes around
39:39
my experience anyway in my life has been
39:40
it takes around five years
39:43
to create a commercial product
39:47
that takes advantage
39:49
of that technical window opening up
39:51
Sometimes you start before the window's quite open
39:54
and you can't get through it
39:55
and you push it up and you push
39:56
it up
39:56
Sometimes it just takes a lot of work
39:58
Took that long, you know, with the Apple II
40:01
took that long with the Mac
40:03
you know, took a Lisa along the way
40:05
a hundred million dollars
40:07
It takes a while
40:07
it's a lot expensive to push those windows open
40:10
It's, and in our case
40:13
you know, our first product failed
40:15
We came out with this cube
40:16
and we sold ten thousand of them
40:18
Why?
40:19
Because
40:19
we weren't quite there yet and we made
40:21
some mistakes along the way and we had
40:23
to course correct
40:24
You know, Macintosh was a course correction off the Lisa
40:27
So
40:29
with Apple II and III we did it
40:30
in reverse
40:31
But the
40:35
It takes around five years or
40:37
some number of years like that to
40:39
to, to realize that window opening
40:41
and then it seems to take about another
40:43
five years to really exploit it in the marketplace
40:46
And, and let me give you some examples in
40:49
from my life. Apple II
40:52
lasted fifteen years
40:54
Fifteen years. The hardware churned
40:56
but basically it was the same for fifteen years
40:59
DOS, you know, DOS just passed ten years
41:02
I don't think anyone would
41:04
disagree that it's gonna easily last another five
41:06
right?
41:07
Unfortunately
41:10
And Mac, you know, Mac is eight years old
41:14
right? No question it's gonna last another four or five years
41:17
right?
41:17
These things are hard. It's not
41:19
they don't last because it's convenient or even
41:21
because it's economic
41:23
They last cause they're really
41:24
this is hard stuff to do
41:27
And so
41:29
when We are pushing that window open
41:33
I think with our current generation of products
41:35
we finally got the window open
41:36
After six years, it's open
41:38
We've got an extremely elegant implementation
41:41
and we've got five years of work to
41:43
do to exploit it in the marketplace
41:45
And when, you know, we'll peak in five years
41:47
Five years, we'll all sit around and say
41:48
okay
41:48
it's time to get started on the next
41:50
thing
41:51
It's time to get going on the next thing
41:53
maybe four years from now
41:54
But we've got a lot of work ahead
41:56
of us just to move this thing out
41:57
and educate the market
41:59
and continue to refine it based on market
42:01
feedback
42:02
So
42:03
everything I know about
42:06
technology windows that are open or just about
42:08
open
42:09
is in NextStep or we're working on it
42:11
in the labs
42:12
And these things generally don't come along independently
42:14
They kind of clumps of them come together
42:16
has been my experience
42:18
So the things that aren't in there right now
42:22
That I can talk about
42:23
there's
42:24
there's some video stuff that's really interesting that's
42:26
gonna be integrated in. There's some
42:28
security stuff that's really fascinating that's integrating in
42:31
But most of the core technology's in there
42:35
Products are getting smaller and portable
42:36
Products are getting much
42:37
much faster, but these things are well known
42:40
You know, the products that we can put on
42:43
that we can give to you in the next
42:45
in the next year or two are
42:46
are gonna be
42:47
running at speeds that I find hard to believe
42:50
and I've been doing this for a while
42:53
So I, I think the window's open
42:55
and
42:56
and I think object-oriented technology
42:58
is the biggest
43:00
technical breakthrough I have seen since the early eighties with
43:05
with, graphical user interfaces
43:07
And I think it's bigger
43:08
actually
43:09
It will prove to be bigger over time
43:11
Yes
43:19
If
43:21
you're a software company
43:26
well, the Microsoft's made it easy
43:32
Yeah, I'm sorry. The question is
43:42
if you're a software company
43:43
should you develop apps or should you develop
43:45
objects and tools?
43:46
And see
43:47
the software industry with Microsoft and Lotus and were perfect
43:50
made it real easy
43:51
Unless you've got twenty or thirty million dollars
43:53
burning a hole in your pocket
43:54
so you can go out and hire a
43:55
few hundred people to develop
43:57
what it takes to develop one of these
43:58
polished shrink-wrapped apps on Mac or on Windows
44:02
then you don't have much of a choice
44:05
There's not a real opportunity there to
44:07
if you, assuming you had the best spreadsheet today
44:10
you could easily spend fifty million dollars marketing
44:12
it before you'd be breaking even
44:15
selling it
44:16
because of just how expensive it is to market a product
44:19
today
44:21
Right
44:26
Well, assume that you have a breakthrough spreadsheet
44:30
Again, on mainstream platforms, it'll take you fifty million
44:35
fifty million dollars to just rise above the noise
44:38
noise level and market it
44:40
So
44:41
what the brightest people I know of today
44:43
are doing is they're writing objects
44:46
They're writing
44:47
hunks of things
44:48
that other developers are gonna use to build
44:50
apps
44:52
and they're going where
44:54
where everybody isn't, and that's, I think
44:57
gonna be the next new thing
45:00
Yeah
45:16
I think your question is
45:17
what is our philosophy on marketing our products
45:19
to higher education?
45:22
well, we started off selling only to higher education
45:25
which, which arguably was a mistake
45:28
And, but we've done really well there
45:30
and our hearts are there
45:31
and we sold a lot of
45:32
Macintoshes there too when we were at Apple
45:35
And I, I think it's a no-brainer
45:38
I think you take your products
45:39
you discount them as heavily as you can
45:40
you sell them into higher education
45:42
Higher education's a wonderful place to give you
45:45
great feedback
45:46
about how to make your products better and
45:47
what's wrong with them
45:48
and it's a great place to
45:52
educate
45:53
Bright people that you can hire and that
45:54
your customers can hire when
45:55
when they graduate. So we do exactly that
45:57
We have
45:58
I think we're sold on about three hundred
46:00
and fifty campuses in the United States
46:02
We are clearly the number one selling workstation across the US
46:06
and we're the number two selling computer of
46:08
any type at campuses like here MIT or Stanford
46:12
right behind the, Macintosh. We sell more computers at MIT than
46:15
than, than PCs
46:17
through the, the institutional resale, engines
46:22
So we do, we do as much as we can
46:25
and I think it's been pretty effective
46:27
What do you think?
46:32
Right
46:41
Well, what's happening is
46:43
is the project Athena's didn't succeed for a
46:45
reason
46:47
they didn't succeed because
46:49
They had a lot of good ideas as a research project
46:52
but
46:52
the people necessary to commercialize those things and
46:55
make them into real products
46:58
aren't necessarily the same people
46:59
that are gonna pioneer the ideas at a
47:01
university like MIT
47:03
And so those projects never quite get baked
47:07
They, the, the recipes kinda developed and they
47:09
you make a few samples and it's pretty good
47:11
but the computer industry is pretty advanced
47:13
and so other people pick up those ideas
47:15
and make them into real products
47:16
and they kinda leave the research projects in
47:18
the dust if the researchers
47:20
drop research and start trying to commercialize stuff
47:23
And I can point to a hundred examples of that in
47:25
in higher education
47:26
So it's probably good that Project Athena has a beginning
47:30
a middle, and an end
47:31
so that those people don't get stuck trying
47:33
to do commercial software in an academic environment
47:36
It's kind of a mismatch
47:39
As far as we're concerned
47:40
what
47:40
what we're doing
47:41
is there's a lot of labs that are being put in
47:43
in higher education
47:45
and we're winning almost every one of those
47:46
And we really go hard after the labs
47:48
so that people that can't afford the computers have
47:50
have public access
47:52
And, most universities now have fairly elaborate campus-wide networks
47:56
It's no, no longer a new cutting edge thing
47:58
and we plug right into those
48:00
So I, I think it's
48:02
life's moved beyond where it was a few
48:04
years ago where those kind of projects were really important
48:07
and, and the knowledge to do that is
48:08
exists fairly widespread
48:11
A few more, yeah
48:13
Good question
48:40
I'm not sure I learned this when I was at Apple
48:42
but I learned it
48:44
based on the data
48:46
when I was at Apple
48:48
and that is
48:54
I now take a longer term view on
48:56
people
48:58
In other words, when I see something not being done right
49:02
my first reaction isn't to go fix it
49:06
it's to say
49:10
we're building a team here and we're gonna
49:12
do great stuff for the next decade
49:13
not just the next year
49:15
And so
49:17
what do I need to do to help
49:19
so that the person that's screwing up
49:21
learns versus how do I fix the problem?
49:26
And, that's painful sometimes
49:29
And my
49:30
and I still have that
49:31
first instinct to go fix the problem
49:33
but
49:34
that's
49:34
taking a longer term view on people
49:36
is probably the biggest thing that's changed
49:38
And then, and I, I don't know, that's, you know
49:40
maybe the part that's biological
49:42
but
49:45
yes
49:53
Management style, what's our management style?
49:55
How do we resolve conflict?
49:58
I, I've never believed in the theory that if
50:00
if
50:01
we're on the same management team and
50:02
a decision has to be made and
50:04
I decide in a way that you don't like
50:07
and I say, come on, buy into the decision
50:10
You know, buy into it
50:11
Like, we're all on the same team
50:12
You don't agree, but buy into it
50:13
Let's go make it happen
50:15
Because what happens is
50:16
sooner or later
50:19
you're paying somebody
50:21
to do what they think is right
50:23
But then
50:24
you're trying to get them to do what
50:25
they think isn't right
50:27
And it, it, and sooner or later it outs and
50:29
and you, you end up having that conflict
50:31
So I've always felt that
50:34
the best way is to get everybody in
50:36
a room and talk it through in
50:39
until you agree. Now that's not everybody in the company
50:43
but that's
50:45
everybody that's really involved in that decision that needs to
50:50
to execute
50:51
And
50:54
so that's how we try to run next
50:56
The way we run next is we have
50:57
a team at the top we call the
50:58
policy team. There's eight people
51:02
Mike is on it
51:03
I'm on it
51:03
we have six other people on it
51:05
And the key dis
51:06
we have two things we try to do
51:08
One is we try to differentiate between
51:10
the really important decisions and the ones that
51:12
we don't have to make
51:14
And the really important ones
51:16
we work on it till we all agree
51:19
Because we're paying people
51:21
to tell us what to do
51:23
In other words
51:23
I don't view that we pay people to
51:25
do things
51:26
That's easy to find people to do things
51:28
What's
51:28
harder is to find people to tell you
51:30
what should be done
51:31
right? That's what we look for
51:32
So we pay people a lot of money
51:35
and we expect them to tell us what
51:36
to do
51:37
And so when you
51:39
when that's your attitude
51:41
you shouldn't run off and do things if
51:42
people don't all feel good about them
51:44
And, and the
51:45
the key to making that work is to
51:46
realize there's not that many things that
51:49
any one team really has to decide
51:51
And we
51:51
we might have
51:53
twenty five really important things we have to
51:55
decide on a year
51:57
Not a lot
52:00
So that's
52:01
that's how we try to run it
52:02
Sometimes it works, and sometimes we're still working on it
52:07
I, I can't think of once
52:09
I can't, maybe there's once or twice
52:11
but I, I can't even recall a time when I've said
52:13
damn it, I'm the CEO
52:14
and we're doing it this way
52:16
You know?
52:19
I can recall a time when I've said
52:20
we don't see eye to eye
52:22
and you're off the team
52:22
You know?
52:28
I've had to say that once or twice
52:30
over a prolonged period of time
52:32
when
52:33
a person
52:34
has not
52:35
wanted to go in the same direction we've
52:37
wanted to go in as a team
52:39
It's my job every once in a while to say
52:40
hey, you want to go this way?
52:42
We want to go this way
52:44
It's not working
52:45
So, but, when people are on the team
52:50
then we work it out
52:54
Yeah
53:13
I wanna, I wanna come back to your premium product characterization
53:16
cause our products actually cost
53:18
you know
53:18
close to half of what Sun's do
53:20
And the reason they do is
53:21
is we have the most automated factory in the industry
53:23
and we have a great VLSI design group
53:25
which designs stuff in a lot less pro- Do you guys
53:28
manufacturing, do you care about that?
53:31
We should talk about that
53:32
in a minute
53:34
the industry's bifurcating right now
53:37
and what's happening is
53:38
is that the Macs and the PCs as
53:40
you know them today are all gonna be just like this
53:41
hold up your power book
53:43
all gonna be just like this
53:43
only lighter and smaller
53:45
before very long
53:48
and they're taking the technology we have today
53:51
not particularly changing it
53:52
and getting it
53:53
off the desktop in portable forms
53:56
And they're giving up a few things for that
53:58
but nothing terribly, profound
54:02
However
54:03
we're getting all sorts of signals from certain
54:05
parts of the markets
54:06
that they want things that are the enemy of that
54:09
right? Well, what are they?
54:11
Well, speed
54:12
Speed is the enemy of portability because speed takes power
54:17
right? So the kind of speed that our customers want
54:20
it would run for three and a half minutes on batteries
54:23
and that's useless
54:26
The second thing they want is they want
54:27
a lot more storage on their disk drives
54:29
and a lot more memory
54:30
Again, the enemy of portability for power and
54:32
and size reasons
54:34
Another thing they want is really high speed
54:36
networking
54:37
Right? The radio lands on these things
54:40
at best
54:41
are going to go 19.2 kilobits per second
54:43
Our customers want 100 megabits per second and
54:45
higher
54:46
You're not going to do that with a
54:47
radio LAN any time in the next five
54:49
years
54:49
Another thing our customers want is our mix
54:51
is shifted to like 80% color
54:53
and they want true color to do photographs
54:55
There is no flat panel color display today
54:58
that will do photographic quality color
55:00
And they want big ones
55:01
because once you have multitasking
55:03
and you run a bunch of things at once
55:04
you need a bigger window into this electronic
55:05
world
55:07
When you're using your computer for two or
55:08
three hours a day
55:09
you don't want to be looking
55:10
you know, through blinders this big
55:12
You want something bigger
55:14
So these are all the enemy of
55:16
of that today
55:18
And we're working on smaller products
55:21
for sure, but it's
55:22
it's really tough to get both
55:24
And we're optimizing for the power
55:28
because we see a giant hole there
55:30
for running these mission-critical custom apps
55:33
and what people are doing needs more power
55:36
So that's, that's what we're optimizing for
55:38
But you know what
55:38
let's talk about manufacturing. How many of you
55:40
have a manufacturing background?
55:42
Oh, that's great
55:43
I love manufacturing
55:45
And, what kinds of things?
55:46
What kinds of companies?
55:49
You, you, you have pharmaceuticals?
55:52
Any auto people here?
55:55
Auto? Electronics?
55:57
Which, TI?
55:59
Motorola?
56:04
Yeah, I heard that rumor too
56:05
No, it couldn't be further from the truth
56:07
We, we, we love manufacturing at Next
56:10
and, when I was at Apple
56:12
I had the good fortune to
56:14
lead the effort to build the Mac factory
56:16
and we designed and built and operated that factory
56:19
and, it was a real breakthrough
56:21
It was the best factory in the industry
56:22
till we built the one at Next
56:24
And we made a lot of
56:26
we made a lot of mistakes
56:27
though
56:29
as an example, I remember walking through it
56:31
you know
56:31
one of the things you learn when you
56:32
start building factories is
56:34
that warehouses are really bad
56:36
Right? Warehouses are bad because you
56:38
tend to put things in them
56:39
And inventory is really bad
56:41
Inventory is really bad because if it's defective
56:44
you don't find out about it for a while
56:46
and you don't close the quality feedback loop
56:48
with the vendor
56:49
and correct the problem until they've made a
56:50
zillion of them
56:51
What you want to do is find the problem
56:53
the first one that comes in the door
56:54
and stop them from making more until you
56:56
fix the problem. So
56:57
warehouses also cost money
56:59
because you put all the stuff in them
57:00
and the stuff you have to go borrow
57:01
money from the bank or use money that could be
57:03
you know, used in a more productive purpose
57:04
So warehouses are bad
57:07
And you want to go to JIT
57:08
I'm sure you've studied this all and studied
57:10
examples
57:12
I was walking through the Mac factory one day
57:13
and the two biggest pieces of automation we
57:15
put in were a
57:16
giant small parts storage and retrieval system
57:20
It was these totes that ran around
57:22
And the second one was this giant burn-in
57:24
system at the end
57:26
And, you know
57:27
a few tens of millions of dollars worth
57:29
of equipment
57:30
And I realized, unfortunately too late
57:33
that both of them are warehouses
57:35
They're just high tech warehouses
57:38
right?
57:39
And so when we looked at Next
57:42
we said, no warehouses of any kind
57:46
We have a true JIT factory
57:48
Stuff comes in and is delivered right to
57:50
the point of use on the factory floor
57:52
There is no warehouse
57:54
Deliveries are made daily
57:56
sometimes more frequently than that
57:58
There is no outgoing warehouse
58:02
Everything is visible
58:04
And
58:08
the reason that we were able to do
58:10
a lot of what we've done
58:12
is because we looked at manu
58:13
well, let me give you an example
58:15
when we were learning about manufacturing at Mac
58:17
we hired a
58:18
Stanford business school professor at the time named Steven Wheelwright
58:21
who Harvard's since stolen away
58:22
I think
58:23
And he, did a neat thing
58:24
He drew on the board a little chart
58:26
First time I met him
58:27
he said
58:28
you can view
58:29
all companies from a manufacturing perspective this way
58:32
You can say there's five stages
58:35
One, two, three, four, five
58:36
Right there I'll have this thing
58:38
Stage one
58:39
is companies that view manufacturing as a necessary
58:43
evil
58:44
They wish they didn't have to do it
58:45
but damn it, they do
58:47
And, all the way up through stage five
58:49
which is companies that view
58:51
manufacturing as a competitive opportunity for competitive advantage
58:56
right?
58:56
We can get better time to market and
58:58
get new products out faster
58:59
We can get lower costs
59:00
We can get higher quality
59:01
And in general, you know
59:02
you can sort of
59:03
put the American flag here and put the
59:07
Japanese flag here
59:12
And that's changing, however. That's changing
59:15
And
59:15
and it's changing because people like you are
59:16
going into manufacturing
59:18
Companies are starting to
59:19
realize that we were great at this one time
59:21
and then we took it for granted
59:24
and, people are starting to pay good salaries now and
59:26
and get good people
59:28
And so we want to be one of these
59:32
and we try very hard
59:34
by the way, just going back to software for a minute
59:36
I often apply the scale
59:38
to computer companies and how they look at software
59:41
See
59:41
I think most computer companies are stage one
59:44
They wish software had never been invented
59:46
I put Compaq in that category
59:48
and IBM's maybe stage two
59:51
and things like that. And I think there's only
59:52
there's only com, you know
59:54
Sun's maybe sort of in the middle
59:55
maybe here
59:56
I think there's only three companies here
59:58
and that's us, Apple, and Microsoft
60:00
in, in, in stage five
60:02
We start everything with the software and work back
60:04
But anyway, going back to manufacturing
60:06
we
60:08
started looking at the factory
60:10
as a software problem
60:13
And the first people we hired in the
60:14
factory were some software engineers
60:16
We convinced them to move from R and D into software
60:19
which was not easy. We had to give them bonuses
60:21
we had to cajole them
60:22
we had to promise them they could come
60:23
back if they hated it
60:25
and they went over there and we said
60:27
this is really just a software problem with
60:29
interesting I O devices called robots
60:31
That's all it is. And so we started
60:33
building the software first. And our first robots that we got
60:37
we
60:39
specced them out
60:40
and we bought them completely turnkey
60:43
with the robot arms on them and all
60:44
the electronics and the software to control them
60:48
and we specced it out
60:49
but we didn't write it
60:51
And they didn't, they worked okay
60:53
some of them are still in use
60:54
but they weren't great
60:56
And be, being software folks, we weren't real happy
61:00
they weren't, they weren't elegant
61:01
We couldn't do what we wanted with the
61:02
robots. We couldn't tie in a quality information
61:04
system to them and all this other stuff
61:05
we wanted. So the second generation
61:07
we specced out the hardware and had somebody
61:09
build the hardware for us
61:11
but we
61:11
wrote all the software on our own computers
61:14
We're object oriented, so we started writing robot objects
61:16
quality objects, you know
61:18
all sorts of objects to control this factory
61:21
And we found out our computer was great
61:23
for it
61:24
And so our whole factory now runs on
61:25
this object oriented factory and quality system
61:30
The last generation of our latest generation of robots
61:32
which we've deployed this year
61:33
we actually built the hardware
61:36
I've been to Japan maybe
61:37
you know, a lot of times
61:38
maybe thirty, forty times
61:40
and I love to tour factories over there
61:41
and I
61:42
they always amaze me because they built
61:44
everything themselves. They weren't afraid of anything
61:46
They needed a robot
61:47
they'd try to buy one
61:48
but if they couldn't
61:49
they'd actually engineer it and build it
61:50
And you'd think this was really expensive
61:52
but we found out it's pretty cheap
61:55
It's actually cheaper than buying them
61:57
And so we've actually now designed our inspect
61:59
out our own robots. We don't mill the
62:01
metal or anything. We get that all made
62:02
We put them all together
62:03
And we do the software top to bottom
62:05
And we have now some extraordinarily advanced robots
62:08
in the factory
62:09
And our computers are built start to finish on the
62:12
on, on
62:12
on the key components completely untouched by human hands
62:16
So
62:17
we're pretty convinced we're the low cost producer
62:20
We do it in Fremont
62:21
California, right under our nose
62:24
And we export them to Japan and all
62:26
sorts of other places
62:28
And Canon is our partner in Japan
62:30
and they, they do very
62:31
very thorough quality audits
62:34
And we're now at the point where
62:35
we're directly shipped to stock with them
62:37
and they, they say we're a very high quality supplier
62:40
So
62:43
Yeah
62:49
they, well, we don't give everybody permission to do that
62:52
but yes, they can
62:54
Here's how it works
62:55
one of the things we do is we actually
62:58
when we want to build an engineering prototype
62:59
see, what happens in most
63:02
one of the key things that manufacturing can
63:04
contribute to competitive advantage is time to market
63:07
Why is that?
63:08
Because the way most things work is you
63:10
design your product here
63:14
and after you're done
63:15
you throw it over the wall
63:17
and you design your manufacturing process here
63:20
right?
63:21
Sorting out a bunch of things that maybe
63:22
weren't done right here
63:23
fixing them, changing them
63:24
and then completing the process design
63:26
What you want to do
63:28
is do this and ship it right here
63:30
while your competitors are still here
63:32
And that's what we've been able to do in
63:34
in many cases. What we do is we
63:36
suck data
63:37
out of our CAD systems in engineering
63:40
We zing them around over the local networks
63:42
over at T1 to Fremont
63:43
the factory's about fifteen minutes away
63:45
And in our own computers
63:48
we compute all of the robot placement programs
63:51
fully optimized path
63:54
We compute all the vision system programs
63:56
we check it against the bill of materials
63:58
in the IS system
63:59
and we download it to the robots
64:01
and we're ready to build a board
64:03
lot size of one
64:05
in between two production CPU boards
64:07
on the line
64:08
Full surface mount with all of our automation technology
64:11
Now
64:12
the key is
64:13
that manufacturing
64:15
did that so well for engineering
64:18
that we haven't built a prototype in engineering
64:21
for two years
64:22
We haven't built a wire wrap or any
64:24
other kind of prototype in engineering for two
64:26
years. Everything has been built in the factory
64:29
Now, what does that mean?
64:31
What that means is manufacturing gets involved from day one
64:36
right?
64:37
Because the fact that the engineering guys call
64:38
up manufacturing and go
64:39
hey, we want to build a prototype
64:41
we're going to need these special parts in the thing
64:43
take a look at this
64:44
tell us what you think
64:44
we'd like to do it tomorrow
64:46
let us know if that's okay
64:47
blah, blah
64:47
blah. They get involved from day one
64:49
And what it also means
64:51
so we get this parallelism
64:52
Secondly, a lot of times when you build prototypes
64:57
it's not quite the same technology as you're
64:59
going to use in production
65:01
And so
65:01
all the accumulated knowledge you get from building your prototypes
65:04
you throw away when you change technology to go into production
65:07
and you start over in that accumulation process
65:10
Because we don't change technology
65:13
we don't throw anything away
65:16
we don't waste time
65:18
And
65:19
it's led to one of the healthiest relationships
65:21
between an engineering and manufacturing group I've ever
65:24
seen in my life
65:25
They're all working off the same databases
65:27
they're all working on the same processes
65:30
they're all working in a very disciplined process
65:32
environment to where when any processes are changed
65:35
they all get together and
65:37
and review the proposals and all buy into it
65:40
And, it's not that hard
65:42
The, the, the key to it all
65:44
though
65:44
is we didn't go out and hire a
65:45
bunch of manufacturing people
65:48
We went out and hired engineers
65:50
and we convinced them that we were gonna be different
65:53
we were gonna pay them exactly the same as
65:55
matter of fact
65:55
we paid them a little more at the beginning
65:57
but we pay them exactly the same as
65:59
R&D
66:01
no different. There's migration both directions
66:04
not just from manufacturing into R&D
66:06
but both directions
66:08
And they're not second-class citizens
66:10
They have the same offices
66:12
they have the same test equipment
66:13
they have the same computers on their desks
66:17
and it took us a while to convince
66:19
them that we were really serious
66:22
until, for about the first few years
66:24
we had more PhDs in manufacturing than we did design engineering
66:26
until design engineering stole a few of them away
66:29
So it's, it's really paid off for us
66:31
and I think it's a
66:33
one of our real opportunities for competitive advantage
66:37
Yeah. I think one or two more
66:38
and we, gotta run, probably you do too
66:41
Yes, up there, Ty
66:46
Yeah
66:51
How are we getting our raw materials?
66:53
You mean like
66:54
what
66:55
truck line brings them in or what do you mean?
67:03
see
67:04
the key thing is that's not our problem
67:07
That's our supplier's problem
67:09
So
67:09
we agree with our supplier when the stuff
67:11
is gonna arrive on our factory floor
67:14
And if they can
67:15
if they're together enough to ship it by truck
67:18
that's fine. If they have to ship it by air
67:21
that's too bad
67:23
if they wanna have a warehouse next to
67:25
ours because they're not good enough
67:27
well, then they have to do that
67:29
Now, we're not giant
67:30
so we can't go command people to do things
67:32
but What's happened is
67:34
is we have a fairly narrow supply base
67:36
We, we, we don't have three billion suppliers
67:39
and they see tremendous advantages in working with
67:42
us
67:42
We're pushing our
67:43
quality information systems back to them
67:45
As an example
67:46
Motorola's one of our key suppliers
67:47
Almost every key supplier has next computers
67:50
and we send them statistical quality information
67:53
sometimes daily, daily
67:57
off our
67:57
automated quality information systems on their parts
68:00
And
68:01
those kinds of things are extremely valuable to
68:03
them. So while we're not
68:05
we're not Goliath
68:06
we're a very valuable David to work with
68:09
And so they really bend over backwards to
68:11
work with us. And
68:13
we try to push
68:14
the problems where they belong
68:16
If it's our problems
68:17
we take full responsibility for them
68:19
We own our process
68:21
But they
68:22
it's their job to get us zero defect
68:24
material on time per agreements
68:28
And our philosophy is our money doesn't break
68:30
after we give it to them
68:31
so their part shouldn't break after they give
68:32
it to us
68:50
Yeah
68:53
I, you know
68:54
I think Macs are gonna continue to grow
68:55
It, it depends on what Apple does
68:57
I think certain segments of the Mac market
68:59
are gonna continue to grow
69:01
I think certain segments of the Mac market
69:05
are not gonna be
69:07
be targeted for future growth
69:10
And
69:12
I think Macs are good computers to do
69:13
certain things
69:15
But to do the things that people
69:16
I think, are gonna wanna do in a few years
69:19
I don't think you can do em on
69:20
a Mac
69:20
I don't think you can do em on
69:21
DOS and Windows
69:24
and so I
69:25
I think there's a need for some new technology
69:27
Just like, you know
69:29
there's a lot of things that
69:31
you could do on DOS
69:32
when the Mac came out
69:33
But there were some new things you just couldn't
69:35
and it would take a long time
69:36
And I think the same way with the Mac
69:39
Hey
69:39
we have to head off into the sunset back to California
69:41
but
69:42
thanks for a chance to be with you
69:43
all for some time
69:45
Thanks

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